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THE EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
ON TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION: 
THE CASE OF CHLORINE MANUFACTURING 
by 
Nolan Miller, Lori Snyder, and Robert Stavins
∗ 
We use a hazard model to estimate the effect of environmental regulation on the diffusion of membrane cell production technology in 
the chlorine manufacturing industry.  We estimate the effect of regulation on both the adoption of the membrane technology at 
existing plants and on the exit of existing plants using older technologies.  We find that environmental regulation did affect the 
diffusion of the cleaner technology in the chlorine industry.  However, it did so not by encouraging the adoption of membrane cells by 
existing facilities, but by reducing the demand for chlorine and hence encouraging the shutdown of facilities using the 
environmentally inferior options.   
1.  Introduction 
In order to assess the effects of regulation on environmental and economic 
performance of firms, it is important to understand the interaction between regulation and 
technological change.  The costs of compliance with environmental regulations are 
determined, in part, by the cost and availability of alternative production and abatement 
technologies, and regulations themselves can affect the nature and rate of technological 
change (Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 2002).  As a result, the economic and environmental 
impacts of regulation are affected by the technology choices made by individual plants. 
 
We examine the effect of regulation on technological change in the chlorine 
manufacturing industry by focusing on the diffusion
1 of membrane cell technology, 
widely viewed as environmentally superior to both mercury cell and diaphragm cell 
technologies.  The chlorine manufacturing industry has experienced a substantial shift 
over time towards the membrane technology, but only a relatively small fraction of this 
change has come about through adoption of cleaner technologies at existing plants.
2  
                                                 
∗ Snyder is a Ph.D. student in Public Policy at Harvard University; Miller is an Assistant Professor at the 
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; and Stavins is Albert Pratt Professor of 
Business and Government, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and University 
Fellow, Resources for the Future.  We are grateful for helpful comments from Angelique Augereau, 
Christopher Forman, Richard Newell, and David Popp, but the authors alone are responsible for all 
remaining errors. 
1 Schumpeter (1942) distinguished three stages in the process by which a new, superior technology 
permeates the marketplace.  First, invention consists of the development of a scientifically or technically 
new product or process. Second, innovation occurs when a new product or process is commercialized, that 
is, made available on the market. Third, a successful innovation gradually comes to be widely available for 
use in relevant applications through adoption by firms or individuals, a process labeled diffusion.  See Jaffe, 
Newell, and Stavins (2002) for a comprehensive summary of the literature on the effect of environmental 
policy on technology diffusion. 
2 In this context, adoption by an existing plant can mean both conversion of all of an existing plant’s 
capacity (retrofitting) or a combination of retrofitting and new capacity expansion at an existing plant.  In 
the latter case, some capacity is maintained using the older technology.  Of the existing plants that adopted   2  
Most of the change has been due to the use of membrane cells by newly constructed 
facilities (entry) and the closing of facilities using diaphragm and mercury cells (exit).  
Therefore, in this context, technology diffusion can be viewed as a combination of 
adoption, entry, and exit decisions. 
 
In this paper, we examine econometrically two of these aspects of diffusion — 
adoption and exit behavior — to assess the effects of environmental regulation.
3  
Employing plant-level data on technology choice, economic variables, and regulatory 
variables from 1976 to 2001, we examine these adoption and exit decisions with a hazard 
model, considering the effects of both direct regulation of chlorine manufacturing and 
regulation of downstream users of chlorine.  
 
We find that environmental regulation had an effect on technological change, but 
not in the way that many advocates would argue.  Direct regulation of chlorine 
manufacturing did not have a statistically significant effect on adoption of membrane 
technology by existing plants.  However, regulation of downstream uses of chlorine 
changed demand for chlorine, causing plants which disproportionately used the older, 
less environmentally sound technologies to close.  In this way, regulations tended to 
increase over time the share of plants using the cleaner, membrane technology.  This 
pattern in which environmental regulations have their greatest influence on technology 
diffusion through systematic effects on exit (and effects on adoption at time of entry), 
rather than effects on adoption at existing plants, is consistent with previous findings with 
regard to technology innovation.
4 
 
2.  The Chlorine Manufacturing Industry 
 
Over 95 percent of the world's chlorine is produced by an electrolytic process in 
which electric current is introduced to a salt-water brine, resulting in the separation of 
chlorine, hydrogen gas and caustic soda (sodium hydroxide).  Three different types of 
cells have been employed in this electrolytic process:  the mercury cell, the diaphragm 
cell, and the membrane cell.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the membrane technology, about half were total retrofits and half were combinations of retrofit and 
expansions. 
3 The entry aspect is empirically difficult to estimate because one only has data on facilities that choose to 
enter and cannot observe or infer all the possible firms that could have entered during a time period but did 
not.  This renders probabilistic empirical analysis of the entry decision infeasible. 
4 Newell, Jaffe, and Stavins (1999) find this pattern in the effects of regulation on the innovation of energy-
efficiency attributes of a variety of home appliances.   3  
The mercury cell is widely viewed as having the greatest potential for 
environmental damage, due to the potential release of mercury, a highly persistent and 
bio-accumulative toxin.  The diaphragm cell technology, which accounts for two-thirds 
of chlorine produced in the United States, is considered to be more environmentally 
benign than the mercury cell, although not without its own environmental risks, since the 
diaphram cell is composed of layers of asbestos.  The newer membrane process, 
accounting for less than one third of chlorine produced in the United States (Chlorine 
Institute 2001), is the most environmentally benign.  
 
Over the past 25 years, there has been a gradual movement from mercury and 
diaphragm cells to membrane technology. In 1975, plants using mercury cells accounted 
for 22 percent of total chlorine capacity, plants using diaphragm cells accounted for 73 
percent, and membrane cell plant capacity was less than one percent of the total.
5 By 
2001, mercury cell capacity had fallen to 10 percent, diaphragm cells accounted for 67 
percent, and membrane cells accounted for 20 percent (Chlorine Institute 2001).
6 Some of 
the significant increase in membrane cell capacity has come from adoption of membrane 
cells at existing facilities, but the bulk of the diffusion has taken place through entry and 
exit of facilities using mercury and diaphragm cells.  This pattern of diffusion is 
illustrated in Figure 1.  The solid black column represents the total number of facilities 
that contributed to diffusion of membrane technology during the five-year period, either 
through entry, exit, or adoption at existing plants.  The largest share of diffusion came 
through closure of mercury and diaphragm plants.  The next largest contributor to 
diffusion was adoption by existing plants.  New entry played the smallest role. 
 
3.  The Regulation of Chlorine Manufacturing 
 
In 1972, a widely publicized incident of mercury poisoning in Minamata Bay, 
Japan led the Japanese government to prohibit the use of mercury cells for chlorine 
production.  The United States did not follow suit, but it did impose more stringent 
environmental constraints on mercury cell units during the early 1970s.  Subsequently, 
chlorine manufacturing became subject to increased regulation under the Clean Air Act, 
the Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), and the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 
popularly known as Superfund.
7  In addition, chlorine manufacturing became subject to 
public disclosure requirements under the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), which has 
required large manufacturing facilities to make public their annual releases of over 300 
different toxic chemicals since 1986.  Nearly all chlorine manufacturing plants are large 
                                                 
5 The remaining four percent of chlorine was produced at facilities that used a method other than 
electrolysis. 
6 The remaining three percent of chlorine was produced at facilities that use a method other than 
electrolysis. 
7 These command-and-control regulations typically involve both fixed and variable compliance costs.   4  




In addition to regulation of the chlorine manufacturing process, there has also 
been increased environmental pressure on industries that use chlorine as an input. This 
indirect regulation is potentially important for chlorine manufacturing technology choices 
because a large share of chlorine is manufactured for on-site use in the production of 
other products.  In our sample, 54 percent of facilities are co-located with manufacturing 
units in different three-digit SIC codes, the most frequently observed pairings being with 
organic chemical, plastics, and pulp and paper mills. Changes in regulations in these 
downstream industries can have substantial impacts on the demand for chlorine and can 
affect the rate of entry and exit of chlorine production plants. 
 
Two major (indirect) regulations may have altered the demand for chlorine. One 
is the Montreal Protocol, which regulates the production of ozone-depleting chemicals, 
such as chloroflorocarbons (CFCs), for which chlorine is a key ingredient.  In 1987, the 
Montreal Protocol imposed a timeline for phasing out CFC production in the United 
States and other industrialized countries.  The other potentially important indirect 
regulation is the so-called “Cluster Rule” regulation of releases from pulp and paper 
mills. Finalized in 1998, the Cluster Rule, tightened restrictions on the release of 
chlorinated compounds to both water and air.  This led to increased interest by the 
industry in non-chlorine bleaching agents, which in turn may have affected the economic 
viability of some chlorine plants.  
 
4. Empirical  Model 
 
We utilize a proportional hazard model to analyze the effects of economic and 
regulatory variables on adoption and exit decisions by chlorine manufacturing plants 
from 1976 to 2001.  The hazard model is appropriate because our focus is on the timing 
of technology decisions.
9   Plants face different anticipated returns to adoption of 
membrane technology.  Those with higher anticipated returns are expected to adopt 
earlier, if adoption cost is falling over time.  Economic and regulatory conditions can 
affect expected costs and returns, and, hence, affect the timing of adoption.
10  
                                                 
8 Large manufacturing facilities are defined as having 10 or more employees and using/processing 25,000 
pounds per year or manufacturing 10,000 pounds per year of a listed chemical. 
9 See Kiefer (1988) for a general discussion of the use of hazard models in economics.  Kerr and Newell 
(2001) utilize a hazard model to study the effect of different regulatory instruments on the rate of 
isomerization adoption by oil refineries.   
10 The model of facility-decision making that underlies the hazard framework is one in which the facility 
chooses the optimal time of adoption or shutdown to maximize expected returns.  Alternative theoretical 
and empirical models were considered.  In particular, the multinomial logit model would be consistent with 
a decision-making framework where in every period the plant gets a draw of a series of random variables 
and based on that draw chooses to shutdown, operate using the same technology, or operate using (at least 
partially) a new technology.  Snyder (2002) includes a discussion of model choice in this context.  The 
results are very similar using these two different modeling approaches.   5  
 
The hazard function is defined as the probability of adopting membrane 











where f(t) is the probability density function for adoption and F(t) is the cumulative 
distribution function.  To measure the effects of explanatory variables on the hazard rate, 
we employ the proportional hazard model, which separates the hazard rate into two 
components:  a baseline hazard rate which is a function of time, ( ) t h0 ; and a function of 
the covariates, usually defined as exp(X′β), where β is a vector of parameters that weight 
the explanatory variables X.  Combining these, the hazard rate h(t) is written: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) β ' exp 0 X t h t h = . 
 
The coefficients are then estimated using maximum likelihood.
11 
 
In a proportional hazard model, the changes in the explanatory variables shift the 
baseline hazard.  The baseline hazard function can be left unspecified, as in a Cox 
proportional hazard model, or parameterized by specifying a particular distribution for 
f(t).  While the Cox proportional hazard model has the advantage of not requiring 
assumptions about the form of the underlying hazard function, it also has a major 
shortcoming for this analysis: the effects of any pure time series variables cannot be 
estimated.  Since these effects are potentially important, we instead adopt the 
parameterized baseline hazard approach. 
 
Use of a parameterized baseline hazard model requires a choice of specification.  
An exponential density function yields a constant baseline hazard function. Other 
specifications yield baseline hazard functions that are functions of time, allowing for the 
possibility that the baseline hazard increases or decreases over time.  Commonly used 
distributions that yield monotonically increasing or decreasing hazard functions are the 
Weibull and the Gompertz density functions (Kennedy 1998). 
 
Without strong a priori notions regarding the shape of the underlying baseline 
hazard, we begin by assuming a constant baseline hazard function (i.e., an exponential 
density function) and estimate the hazard model for the adoption and exit decisions.  By 
assuming an exponential density function, we are assuming that the baseline hazard rate 
is constant.
 12  We conduct sensitivity analyses to determine the robustness of the results. 
                                                 
11 A facility that adopts (exits) within the time frame has a contribution to the likelihood function 
equivalent to the density at time t.  A facility that does not adopt (exit) is treated as censored.  Its 
contribution to the likelihood function consists of the probability of survival to time t.  Facilities that exit 
before adopting the membrane technology are treated as censored in the adoption model. 
12 Assuming a constant baseline hazard function does not imply that the probability of adoption is constant 
over time.  If the covariates vary over time, the probability of adoption will also vary.  In particular, the   6  
 
5. Data 
5.1  Dependent Variables 
 
Data on cell technology use at U.S. chlorine manufacturing plants were obtained 
from the Chlorine Institute (2002) and from the Directory of Chemical Producers (SRI 
1976-2001).  One of our two dependent variables, CONVERT, is an indicator of 
membrane adoption at an existing plant, and takes a value of one in the last year a facility 
used the old technology.
13  The other dependent variable, SHUTDOWN, takes a value of 
one if a facility closed during a given year.
14 Table 1 provides summary statistics for the 
variables used in the analysis. 
 
5.2  Explanatory Variables 
 
Size:  Empirical research on technology diffusion has frequently found that larger 
plants are more likely to adopt new technologies or adopt more quickly (David 1966, 
Griliches 1957, Kerr and Newell 2000). We employ two measures of size — plant 
capacity and net sales of the parent company.  These measures reflect two different 
notions of size.  Plant capacity refers to the share of the individual plant in the chlorine 
market.  In contrast, net sales are measured at the parent company, not the individual 
production unit, and hence serve as a proxy for access to capital, risk aversion, and other 
firm-specific factors. 
 
Complexity:  Chlorine is often produced and used on-site as an input in the 
production of other products. Fifty-four percent of the chlorine manufacturing facilities in 
our sample were co-located with manufacturing units operating in a different three-digit 
SIC code, usually other chemical products or pulp and paper.  Such “complexity” of 
operation might affect both the exit and adoption decisions, because the more integrated 
is chlorine production with other high value-added goods, the more costly and difficult it 
might be to shut down a plant either temporarily or permanently. This is particularly true 
                                                                                                                                                 
assumption of a constant baseline hazard rate can generate the typical S-shaped pattern of adoption 
frequently observed in empirical studies of technology diffusion (Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 2002).   
13Defining the variable CONVERT to take a value of one in the last year in which a facility used the old 
technology was done for technical reasons.  STATA implements the hazard function estimation by 
assuming that any event variables, such as CONVERT, that take a value of 1, indicate that the event 
occurred at the end of the period.  So if a facility uses the membrane technology in 2000 and mercury cells 
in 1999, then we assume the change occurred at the end of 1999. 
14 Adoption of membrane cells takes place at both mercury and diaphragm cell plants, with greater 
frequency at diaphragm plants.  In addition, there have been three plants that converted from mercury to 
diaphragm cells over this time period.   These conversions are not included in the variable CONVERT.  
Similarly, plants using all three technologies have shutdown over the period including three plants that had 
converted to the membrane cell.   7  
for chlorine manufacturing because transportation of chlorine is dangerous and itself 
highly regulated.  The variable, COMPLEX, is an integer variable that indicates the 
number of other production processes, as captured in three-digit SIC codes, that occur at 
the manufacturing site.
15  We also used a series of dummy variables representing the 
industry or industries co-located with a given chlorine plant.  The variables CO-PAPER, 
CO-PLASTICS, and CO-ORGANICS take a value of 1 if the plant also produces pulp 
and paper products, plastics, and organic chemicals respectively. 
 
General Economic Conditions:  Chlorine production is a pro-cyclical industry.  
We employ two measures of business activity — lagged values of GDP in the chemical 
manufacturing industry, and lagged values of the real price of chlorine.
16 
 
  Regulatory Variables:  As described above, several regulatory regimes may have 
affected the rate and direction of technology diffusion in the chlorine industry. We 
construct dummy variables that capture whether a facility was affected by a specific 
regulatory regime including:  Superfund, the Montreal Protocol, the pulp and paper 
cluster rule, and the Toxics Release Inventory.
17  We also include a dummy variable that 
indicates whether the plant uses mercury cells, because these cells have been more 
heavily regulated under various regulatory regimes.
18   
 
6.  Results 
6.1  The Adoption Decision 
We have complete data on 51 facilities, eight of which adopted the membrane 
technology during the sample period.
19  The earliest observed adoption at an existing 
                                                 
15 Other measures of complexity were also constructed, including a binomial dummy reflecting multiple 
production processes.  The coefficients are roughly the same, but the binomial variable tends to be less 
statistically powerful in explaining variation in adoption and exit decisions.   
16 We tried alternative lag structures to account for different expectations mechanisms.  The results were 
robust to changes in the lag structure over one to five years. 
17 To construct the pulp and paper indicator, we used self-reported SIC codes from the plants Toxic Release 
Inventory reports.  If the chlorine plant was co-located with a pulp and paper plant (SIC 26) we assumed 
the plant was affected by the cluster rule.  For the Montreal Protocol indicator we cross-referenced chlorine 
plants with plants manufacturing the following chemicals regulated under the Protocol:  fluorocarbons, 
chlorinated methanes, and chlorinated solvents.  The list of plants producing these ozone-depleting 
chemicals was obtained from the Stanford Research Institute, Chemical Economics Handbook (SRI 1993). 
18This will pick up any variation that is common across plants using the same technology, some of which 
may be regulatory and some of which may not be. 
19 We have data on net sales only for plants owned by publicly traded companies.  Restricting our sample to 
publicly traded companies reduces the sample from 65 facilities to 51 facilities.  We also estimated the 
model with the full sample, and found that the model performed poorly.  One possible explanation for the 
difference in results across the two samples is that net sales controls for important differences in adoption 
timing decisions across companies, because all plants owned by the same company have the same value for 
net sales in any given year.     8  
plant was in 1983, and the latest was in 1999.  The results of the estimation of the hazard 
model for the adoption decision are presented in Table 2. 
 
A brief note on interpreting the results from the proportional hazard model is 
required. The results reported in Table 2 are not the estimated values of the coefficients, 
β, but rather the estimated hazard rates.  Thus, an estimated hazard rate greater than 1.0 
indicates that an increase in the covariate increases the baseline hazard, while estimated 
hazard rates less than 1.0 indicate that the respective variable decreases the baseline 
hazard.
20  Due to the non-linear nature of the hazard function, the coefficients do not have 
a direct interpretation.  In order to provide information on the relative importance of the 
explanatory variables on the hazard rate, we calculate the hazard rate when all continuous 
variables are evaluated at their mean and indicator variables are set to zero.  The mean 
hazard rate for the adoption model was 1.28 percent.  The impact on the mean hazard rate 
of increasing a continuous variable by 10 percent or changing an indicator variable to 
one, ceteris paribus, is reported in Table 4. 
 
The analysis shows that larger plants and plants owned by firms with larger sales 
volumes were slightly more likely to switch to the membrane technology.  A ten percent 
increase in either of the variables from their respective mean values leads to roughly a 0.1 
percentage point increase in the hazard rate.  Complex facilities were substantially less 
likely to switch.  If complexity is broken down by industry, chlorine plants co-located 
with pulp and paper mills and plastics plants were significantly less likely to adopt.   
 
Increases in the lagged real price of chlorine (a proxy for expected future prices) 
made technology changes less likely.  A ten percent increase in price above the mean 
causes the average hazard rate to fall by 0.26 percentage points.  A potential explanation 
for this result is that the opportunity cost of the downtime necessary to change 
technologies is greater when real prices are higher.  When GDP in the chemical industry 
was used as an indicator of business activity, the sign and magnitude of the effect was 
similar, but the results were not statistically significant. 
 
In none of the specifications were the effects of the regulatory variables on the 
likelihood of adopting membrane technology statistically significant. Mercury plants, 
which were subject to stringent regulation for water, air, and hazardous waste removal, 
were no more likely to switch to the membrane technology than diaphragm plants.   
Similarly, TRI reporting appears to have had no significant effect on adoption decisions, 
whether TRI is measured as a simple indicator variable, by rank of total releases, or by 
magnitude of reported releases.
21 
                                                 
20Standard errors and significance levels are presented in the table, but significance levels are determined 
by the coefficient estimates and the standard errors, not the estimated hazard rates and the standard errors.  
Also, because the likelihood ratio is estimated using repeated observations on the same plant, the 
assumption of independent identically distributed error terms is suspect.  We instead estimate and report 
clustered standard errors that are adjusted for correlation among observations from the same plant, but 
assume independence across plants. 
21 We tested the robustness of the results to changes in the shape of the underlying hazard function, and 
found that the signs and magnitudes of the explanatory variables’ estimated parameters did not change   9  
6.2  The Exit Decision 
 
We also estimated a hazard model for the exit decision.  The publicly-traded 
sample consisted of 55 facilities, 21 of which ceased operations between 1976 and 2001.  
We tested a variety of specifications, controlling for economic and regulatory 
determinants.  The regression results are found in Table 3 and the incremental effects are 
provided in Table 4 for the preferred specification.  The baseline exit hazard rate with all 
variables set at their mean (and zero for indicator variables) is 2.1 percent. 
 
Despite the fact that the results of the exit analysis are not as robust to changes in 
specification as are the results of the adoption analysis, some interesting and quite 
striking patterns emerge.  Although the economic covariates seem to have had little effect 
on the timing of exit decisions (with the exception of facility-level capacity, which 
retarded shutdown slightly), regulations do explain some of the variation in exit 
decisions.  In particular, indirect regulation of the end-uses of chlorine accelerated 
shutdowns in certain industries.  Facilities affected by the pulp and paper cluster rule and 
the Montreal Protocol were substantially more likely to shut down than were other 
facilities.   If a facility was affected by the pulp and paper cluster rule the hazard rate for 
closing increased by 11.18 percentage points holding all else constant.  Similarly, if a 
facility was affected by the Montreal Protocol the average hazard rate increased by 15.36 
percentage points. 
 
It may appear from the results that facilities that report to TRI were less likely to 
shutdown than facilities that did not report, but it is important to note that nearly all 
facilities that were still in operation in 1986 reported to TRI, and so this parameter may 




Diffusion of new technology is the result of a combination of adoption at existing 
facilities and entry and exit of facilities with various technologies in place.  In chlorine 
manufacturing, total capacity using the cleaner membrane technology has been increasing 
over the past 25 years.  This increase is partly a result of adoption of membrane cells at 
existing plants, but mainly a consequence of plant startups and shutdowns. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
substantially.  The estimated parameters were not statistically different from one (in the case of the Weibull 
specification) or zero (in the case of the Gompertz specification), and so the assumption of a constant 
baseline hazard, consistent with the exponential hazard function, seems reasonable.  We also tested whether 
facilities that eventually shutdown might be less likely to adopt, perhaps because these facilities have lower 
productivity.  Kerr and Newell (2001) suggest including in the adoption model a dummy variable equal to 
one if a facility shutdowns or including the year in which a facility shuts down.  We try both of these tests 
and in both cases the shutdown variables are not statistically significant and the remainder of the 
coefficients have the same magnitude and significance levels. 
22We also estimated the model with other shapes of the underlying hazard function.  With both the Weibull 
and Gompertz estimations, the baseline hazard was found to be increasing over time.   10  
Our results indicate that regulatory factors have not had a statistically significant 
effect on the decision to adopt membrane cell technology at existing plants.  On the other 
hand, indirect regulation of the end-uses of chlorine appears to have accelerated facility 
closures significantly, and thereby to have increased the share of plants using the cleaner, 
membrane technology for chlorine production. 
 
Environmental regulation, in this study, did affect technological change.  It did so 
not by encouraging the adoption of membrane cells by existing facilities, but by reducing 
the demand for chlorine and hence encouraging the shutdown of facilities using the 












Figure 1:  Diffusion of Membrane Cell Technology Over Time, By Source
23
                                                 
23 The membrane diffusion index is equivalent to the total number of facilities that contributed to diffusion during each five-year period, including existing plants 

















































Mercury or Diaphragm Exit
New Membrane Plants  12  
 
Table 1:  Summary Statistics 
Dependent Variables 




Convert        1,181                               74                10  
Shutdown        1,181                               74                37     
Continuous Variables 
   Obs.  Mean  St. Dev.  Min  Max 
Capacity (short tons per year)           1,159                                272                  390                 5                 2,600  
Net Sales (millions of $)              856                           10,123             15,624             143             128,051  
Real Price ($)           1,181                                170                   68               75                    420  
GDP Chemicals (billions of $)           1,143                           93,546             46,982         35,516             191,135  
Releases (pounds per year)              445                       1,648,459         7,931,919                 6         97,700,000  
Complex           1,181   0.68 0.71 0 2
Indicator Variables 
   Obs.  Percent Yes 
Co-paper           1,181  11.69
Co-plastics           1,181  16.09
Co-organics           1,181  41.07
TRI           1,181   56.05
Superfund           1,181   20.58
Mercury           1,181   42.08
Pulp and Paper           1,181   1.27
Montreal           1,181   9.48    13  
 
Table 2:  Membrane Adoption Results 
Hazard Rates with Standard Errors in Parentheses 
   Exponential 1     Exponential 2   Exponential 3   Exponential 4    Weibull    Gompertz   
1.001425 **  1.001449 ** 1.001476 ** 1.002269 **  1.002117 * 1.0023333 ** Capacity 
(0.0007202)     (0.0007004)  (0.0007129)  (0.0010586)     (0.0011511)  (0.0011074)
1.000035 ***  1.000037*** 1.000041*** 1.000071***  1.000067*** 1.000072*** Net Sales 
(0.0000123)     (0.0000133)   (0.0000153)   (0.000023)    (0.0000246)   (0.0000242)
0.9961022 ***                     Real Price  
One Year Lag  (0.0012893)                       
      0.9889416***     0.9867471***  0.9870377*** 0.9866429*** Real Price  
Two year lagged 
moving average        (0.0012408)       (0.0026144)    (0.0028184)   (0.0027934)
          0.9999934              GDP Chem  
Two year lagged 
moving average            (0.0000139)             
0.2358819     0.225293 * 0.2404058 *            Complex 
(0.216387)     (0.2023285)   (0.2048218)             
              0.00000028***  0.00000013*** 0.00000026*** Co-paper 
              (0.00000027)   (0.00000012)  (0.00000026)
              0.0097311 **  0.0102585 ** 0.0096947 ** Co-plastics 
             (0.0206508)     (0.0224946)   (0.0203664)
              0.6274791    0.6283377   0.6158373 Co-organics 
              (0.6050604)    (0.6444411)   (0.5958873)
0.258763     0.2712354   0.2932001   0.202548    0.1713056   0.217482 Mercury 
(0.2909257)     (0.3052939)  (0.3300066)  (0.2589724)     (0.2206982)  (0.2860009)
1.275348      1.343678  1.490352  1.551733    1.24555  1.665934 Superfund 
(1.333887)      (1.389239)  (1.484371)  (1.634522)     (1.251182)  (1.684931)
2.179805     2.279155   2.885759   1.8559    0.7977902   2.348692 TRI 
(2.431213)     (2.496303)   (4.231192)   (2.0166)    (1.474444)   (3.94716)
                   1.723105   -0.0250542 Distribution 
Parameter (Weibull 
and Gompertz)                     (0.7962102)   (0.077866)
Obs.  714    714   694   714   714   714  
Facilities  51    51   51   51   51   51  
Number of Adoptions  8    8   8   8   8   8  
*** implies significance at the 1% level, ** implies significance at the 5% level, * implies significance at the 10% level   14  
 
 
Table 3:  Exit Results 
Hazard Rates with Standard Errors in Parentheses 
   Exponential 1   Exponential 2   Exponential 3   Exponential 4   Weibull    Gompertz   
0.9935431** 0.9935382 ** 0.9934989** 0.9931131** 0.9923375 ** 0.991748 ** Capacity 
(0.0026056)  (0.0026238)  (0.0027377)  (0.0028335)   (0.0029685)   (0.0034752)
1.000009  1.000009  1.000011  1.000012   1.000008   1.000009 Net Sales 
(0.0000111)  (0.0000114)   (0.00001260  (0.0000137)  (0.000011)   (0.0000115)
1.00174                      Real Price  
One year lag  (0.0041249)                     
    1.002117       1.002009  1.001332  1.000866 Real Price 
Two year lagged 
moving average       (0.0054283)       (0.0054321)   (0.004993)   (0.0049316)
        0.9999946             GDP Chem 
Two year lagged 
moving average          (0.000009)            
0.8944402  0.8935033  0.8619944         0.9424272   0.9914054 Complex 
(0.2685876)   (0.268834)   (0.2786425)        (0.3048175)  (0.3274504)
           0.7961666         Co-paper 
           (0.303554)        
          0.5715986         Co-plastics 
          (0.61176)        
          1.134741         Co-organics 
          (0.5152976)        
0.8087449  0.8114902  0.8145432  0.7753466   0.6528025   0.6761894 Mercury 
(0.34614)  (0.3457402)  (0.3493257)  (0.3399259)   (0.2965594)   (0.3297267)
0.8674063  0.8683036  0.7278526  0.8980625   0.5445857   0.6521999 Superfund 
90.5206750  (0.5235591)  (0.4368655)  (0.5621039)   (0.3262042)   (0.4111954)
0.2004088** 0.1984408 *** 0.243056  0.2081657** 0.0299395 *** 0.0179947 *** TRI 
(0.1321814)  (0.1217438)  (0.2233334)  (0.1290414)  (0.027257)   (0.0252212)
6.217796 * 6.317912 * 8.449378 * 6.306457 * 4.344673  4.066813 Pulp and Paper Cluster 
(6.468991)  (6.50979)   (10.225)  (6.93193)   (4.651529)   (4.313415)
8.219747** 8.305729 ** 7.646125** 6.900499 * 6.144653  6.605846 Montreal Protocol 
(8.127696)  (8.184378)  (7.033812)  (7.125591)   (6.998081)   (8.935923)
                2.726174 ** 0.2156139 *** Distribution Parameter (Weibull 
and Gompertz)                  (0.6256582)   (0.0753273)
Obs.  830   830   740   830   830   830  
Facilities  55   55   54   55   55   21  
Number of Adoptions  21   21   20   21   21   55  
*** implies significance at the 1% level, ** implies significance at the 5% level, * implies significance at the 10% level   15  
Table 4:  Effects of Covariates on the Mean Hazard Rate 
Change from Mean Hazard
(Percentage Points)  
   Adoption Exit 
Capacity  0.08% -0.34%
Net Sales  0.10% 0.02%
Real Price of Chlorine  -0.26% 0.08%
Complexity     -0.02%
Co-Paper  -1.28%  
Co-Plastics  -1.27%  
Economic Variables 
Co-Organics 0.00%   
Mercury 0.00% -0.40%
Superfund 0.71% -0.28%
Regulations on Chlorine 
Production 
TRI (Disclosure)  1.10% -1.69%
Pulp and Paper Cluster  11.18% Regulations on End-Use of 
Chlorine  Montreal     15.36%
Bold indicates that respective coefficients are statistically different from zero at 
the 10 percent level or lower.   16  
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